The Affective Moral Judgment

Francia, Victor Hugo Robles (2018) The Affective Moral Judgment. Open Journal of Philosophy, 08 (03). pp. 225-242. ISSN 2163-9434

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Abstract

The affective though and the intuition in moral judgment has been discovered lately (Haidt, 2001). This article analyzes the Moral Judgment theory (Kohlberg, 1964) and the basic logical operations (Piaget, 1950). The rational stages with a few intervention of emotion have been historically assumed by moral judgment theory, which judges the affective as a mistaken notion and as a simple cognitive extension (Greene & Haidt, 2002). This paper demonstrates that the Piagetian basic operations, seriation and categorization are applicable to an affective system. In addition, the intuition is a moral determinant and finally, that neuronal activity confirms an intuitional cognition for the resolution of social problems. It is expected that the present deliberation guides and stimuli researches on the intuition and emotion in moral judgment.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: Research Asian Plos > Social Sciences and Humanities
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email support@research.asianplos.com
Date Deposited: 03 Mar 2023 11:41
Last Modified: 18 Oct 2024 05:06
URI: http://abstract.stmdigitallibrary.com/id/eprint/250

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