DETERRENCE AND SMART SANCTIONS: THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN QUESTION

The article examined Deterrence and smart sanctions in relation to the Russo-Ukrainian question. It adopted the qualitative methodology and applied the Deterrence theoretical framework as a basis for analysis. The study observed that existing literature concluded that deterrence by smart sanctions has been ineffective to the extent that only 30 percent of sanctions actually achieved their goal. We contend that most of those studies were not based on Russia, as such, they could not specifically discuss why current sanctions against Russia have not dissuaded Russia from invading Ukraine or coerced her to retrace her steps on such efforts. Furthermore, the study is going to present a more compelling argument on the constraints that militate against the effectiveness of ongoing measures to deter Russia such as national interest, the existence of sympathetic entities, lack of willpower to exploit the vulnerability of the target state and alternative options for the target state; and recommends that well-coordinated multilateral smart sanctions that address the above lacuna will deliver a better result.